寿险监管政策的不完全信息动态博弈分析  

作　　者：郭金童[1] 解百臣[2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院暨中国华融资产管理公司,北京100033 [2]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《保险研究》2010年第12期35-40,共6页Insurance Studies

摘　　要：寿险监管部门通过制定政策对寿险市场实行监管是保持行业稳定发展的重要措施。在监管过程中，监管部门和寿险公司呈现出一个具有不完全信息的动态博弈过程。本文建立了不完全信息下的寿险监管政策动态博弈模型，就寿险公司业绩操纵行为下寿险公司与监管部门的行为策略进行求解。通过对模型的分析表明监管的过程就是寻找稳定与创新平衡点的过程，既要注意监管政策的科学性，又要把握监管尺度，过激或宽松的监管操作都会阻碍寿险市场的有效运行，寿险创新的发展。It is very important for the life insurance regulation authority to stipulate various policies to maintain industry stability. In the supervision process, the regulator and life insurance companies exhibit a dynamic gaming process with incomplete information. And the dynamic regulation policy game model under the situation of incomplete information is set up to interpret the behavioral strategies between the regulator and the life insurance company who manipulates its financial results. The analyzed results revealed that the regulation process was the process to seek the balance between stability and innovation. The policy makers should pay attention to the scientific nature of the supervision, as well as the good grasp of regulatory standards. Radical or liberal measures would hinder the effective operating of the life insurance market and impede innovations.

关 键 词：寿险监管 监管政策 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F840.62[经济管理—保险]