机构投资者的投票权与流通股东的利益实现——来自股改事件的经验证据  

Vote Control of Institutional Investors and Interests Realization of Tradable-Share H Holders——An Empirical Evidence from Chinese Splitting-share Reform

作　　者：余军[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2010年第12期88-96,共9页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目"证券投资基金运行与资本市场稳定研究"(07JA790032)

摘　　要：借鉴投票权代理及交易理论,将股改博弈划分为流通股东内部博弈和流通与非流通股东之间博弈两个阶段,分别考察机构投资者行使投票权对流通股东的股改收益预期、股改方案满意度及股改总收益三个方面的影响,借此判断机构投资者在股改中是维护还是损害了流通股东的利益。研究表明:一方面,参与股改的流通股东普遍相信机构投资者能够维护他们的利益;另一方面,在与非流通股东的股改博弈中,机构投资者也确实起到了维护流通股东利益的积极作用。结论认为,在我国上市公司的股改事件中,机构投资者的投票权控制有利于流通股东的利益实现。In terms of theories about voting proxy and vote trading,the author divides the process of splitting-share reform into two stages,in which the first is the negotiation within tradable-share holders and the second is the negotiation between tradable and non-tradable share holders.The author evaluates whether the voting proxy of institution harm the interests of minority shareholder or not by examining the influences of institutions on tradable-share holders＇ expected return,satisfaction on the reform proposal,and total return received during splitting-share reform.The empirical results suggest that,firstly,tradable-share holders tended to believe that institutional investors may protect their interests in splitting-share reform,and secondly,institutional investors really safeguarded the interests of tradable-share holders.This research suggests that veto control of institutional investors really help the tradable-share holders to realize their interests in the splitting-share reform of Chinese listed companies.

关 键 词：投票权代理 投票权交易 股权分置改革 事件研究法 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]