基于奖罚的平衡账户新管理方法  被引量:5

A novel method for balance account management with reward-punishment strategy

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作  者:林济铿[1] 王旭东[1] 包铁[1] 

机构地区:[1]天津大学电力系统仿真控制教育部重点实验室,天津300072

出  处:《电力系统保护与控制》2010年第23期44-48,81,共6页Power System Protection and Control

摘  要:提出了对发电厂商进行奖罚的平衡账户管理新方法。该方法的基本思想是根据平衡账户中资金的盈余或亏损状况,对发电厂商进行相应的奖励或罚款,从而使平衡账户中的资金位于一定的限度内。并进一步给出了新平衡账户管理方法下的发电厂商的最优报价策略。算例结果表明,所提出的平衡账户新的管理方法能有效地抑制发电厂商的市场力,降低市场出清电价,实现平衡账户资金在一定范围内波动,维持市场运行的可持续性和稳定性。Based on incentive compatible principle, a new method through reward-punishment strategy for the balance account management is presented in this paper. The idea of the new method is to punish or reward the generation company by the deficit or surplus of the balance account, which leads to the capital of balance account be limited. On the basis of that, the optimal bidding strategy of power suppliers for the method is provided. The test results indicate that the new management method for the balance account proposed can inhibit the market power of the generation and reduce significantly the market clearing price and keep the capital of the balance account to fluctuate within a certain range, which ensures the power market to operate steadily and safely.

关 键 词:电力市场 激励相容 平衡账户 市场力 

分 类 号:TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F123.9[经济管理—世界经济]

 

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