李百特精神时间试验的哲学意义  

The Philosophical Meaning of Benjamin Libet's Experiment

作　　者：陈刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学哲学系,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2010年第6期8-13,60,共7页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金一般项目"意识科学研究前沿的哲学问题"(07JA720004);John Templeton Post-Doc Fellowship at Calvin College的支持

摘　　要：介绍了李百特的精神时间试验及其对人类自由意志的挑战,分析了李百特本人为维护自由意志的存在所作的努力,并指出这个努力是不成功的,随后分析了艾克尔斯、拿塔能、密里和朱菁等人为维护自由意志的存在所作的工作,并论证这些努力同样是不成功的。最后指出解决问题的前景必定是基于某种可行的心灵理论和精神因果性而提出的兼容论。The paper first introduces Benjamin Libet's experiment on mental time and explains why it is a challenge to human free will;secondly,it analyzes Libet's effort to defend free will by adding deliberation between conscious will to act and the full completion of the action,and explain why it is not successful;thirdly it also analyzes other efforts by John Eccles,R.Naatanen,A.R.Mele,and Zhu Jing,and argues that they are also not successful.Finally,the author points out the prospect for the solution to the challenge posed by Libet,i.e.,it must be a compatibilism based on a viable theory of mind and mental causation.

关 键 词：李百特试验 自由意志 意识精神场 慎思 兼容论 

分 类 号：N0[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]