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机构地区:[1]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院,北京100875 [2]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871
出 处:《中国社会科学》2011年第1期88-101,222,共14页Social Sciences in China
基 金:the support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.:70773010);the Key Project of the Chinese Ministry of Education(Grant No.:309007)
摘 要:中国县级决策者主要对上级负责,追求尽可能高的经济增长率,而非居民福利最大化,导致其财政决策偏向生产性支出。基于2067个县(市)2001—2005年财政经济数据的实证检验,为县级财政生产性支出偏向的存在提供了有力的证据。生产性支出偏向严重妨碍公共财政体制建设和向公共服务型政府转型。解决这一问题的根本出路在于逐步增强县级政府满足本地居民需求的激励。Being responsible mainly to their superiors, decision-makers at the county level in China pursue the maximum growth rate rather than their residents’ welfare. This leads to a preference for productive expenditure in their fiscal decisions. An empirical test based on 2,067 counties (cities) provides robust evidence for the existence of productive expenditure bias at the county level. Such bias causes a serious impediment to the construction of a system of public finance and the transformation to public service-oriented government in China. An appropriate solution to this problem is to gradually enhance incentives for county-level governments to satisfy the demands of local residents.
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