隐性知识转移的不完全合约激励措施研究——基于经济人假设与互惠性假设条件下的对比性博弈均衡分析  

Research on the Incentive Measures of Tacit Knowledge Transfer Based on Incomplete Contract

作　　者：穆荣[1] 张同建[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]江苏大学工商管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《情报理论与实践》2011年第1期68-71,共4页Information Studies:Theory & Application

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目的研究成果;项目编号:07BJY017

摘　　要：隐性知识转移是知识管理活动中的一项重要行为,是实现知识的资本性功能的有效方式。知识理论中关于隐性知识转移的研究目前仍停留在宏观理论领域,缺乏对微观层面的应用性探讨。隐性知识转移模型与激励理论中的委托—代理模型存在着天然的拟合性,但是,基于理性经济人前提下的完全合约理论对隐性知识转移行为不存在实质性的指导作用。借助于莫里斯—霍姆斯特姆模型的简化形式,通过对互惠性假设下与经济人假设下隐性知识转移行为的博弈均衡的对比分析可知:基于不完全合约的互惠性激励措施在隐性知识转移活动中更具有现实性的实践意义。Tacit knowledge transfer is an important behavior in knowledge management activities,and is an effective method to realize the capital function of knowledge.In the theory of knowledge,the research on tacit knowledge transfer still dwells in the realm of macroscopic theory,and lacks the application exploration of the microscopic realm.There is a natural match between the tacit knowledge transfer model and the trust-agency model of the incentive theory,but the complete contract theory based on the reasonable economic person assumption has no substantial guidance role on the tacit knowledge transfer behavior.By the use of the simplified form of the trust-agency model,and with the comparative analysis of the game balance of the tacit knowledge transfer behavior in the reciprocity assumption and in the economic person assumption,it＇s known that the reciprocal incentive measures based on incomplete contract have more actual and practicable significance in tacit knowledge transfer activities.

关 键 词：知识转移 激励理论 模型 分析 

分 类 号：C91-0[经济管理]