货币锚的选择与退出:对最优货币规则的再考察  

Exit from Currency Anchor: A Further Study on Optimal Monetary Rule

作　　者：巴曙松[1] 杨现领[2] 

机构地区：[1]国务院发展研究中心金融研究所 [2]华中科技大学经济学院

出　　处：《国际经济评论》2011年第1期141-154,6,共14页International Economic Review

摘　　要：百年来,无论是传统的"固定与浮动之争",还是现代的"中间与两极之争"都无法解决"什么才是最好的汇率制度"这一难题。基于此,本文从"什么才是最优的货币规则"这一新的视角对基本的货币问题进行探讨,并得到一系列结论:(1)货币不可无锚,而锚的选择取决于网络外部性;(2)不同的"下锚"规则本质上决定了货币政策工具和政策目标的界定,原则上,一个国家、货币区甚至全球货币体系可选择黄金、单一或一篮子货币、一篮子商品、货币供给量作为固定的"货币锚";(3)相对较高的外汇储备和适度的资本管制为一国"货币锚"有序退出提供了条件。In the past decades,neither the traditional argument over fixed and floating exchange rate regimes nor the modern division over bipolar and intermediate regimes can answer the question of 'what is the best exchange rate regime?' Based on those arguments,this article starts from the new perspective of 'what is the optimal currency rule' and comes to a set of conclusions: 1) No currency can survive without an anchor,and the choice of the anchor depends on network externalities;2) Different anchor rules essentially determine the definition of monetary tools and policy goals,and in principle,a nation,a currency zone or even the global currency regime can choose gold,a single currency,a basket of currencies,a basket of goods,or money supply as a currency anchor;3) if facing continued loss of foreign exchange reserves and high-velocity capital flows,a country would be forced to exit from the anchor.

关 键 词：货币锚 货币规则 网络外部性 

分 类 号：F832.6[经济管理—金融学]