中小企业联保贷款的信誉博弈分析  

A Game Analysis on the SMEs' Group Lending Reputation Model

作　　者：谢世清[1] 李四光[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学经济学院,100871

出　　处：《经济研究》2011年第1期97-111,共15页Economic Research Journal

摘　　要：本文在考察中小企业的违约信用成本、群体特点、经营环境的基础上,构建了一个中小企业联保贷款的信誉博弈分析框架,讨论了银行如何通过设置信誉成本将银行与企业之间的贷款—还款博弈转化为联保贷款成员企业之间的信誉博弈来降低信用风险的机制。研究结果表明:有效的信誉成本是开展中小企业联保贷款的制度基础;信誉成本主要体现为企业违约后丧失联保企业集团内部交易资格所引致的机会成本;银行的激励条件内生地决定了联保贷款的市场风险边界;银行在开展多元联保贷款时需要在拓展市场风险阈值和潜在信用风险之间进行权衡,以确定最佳的联保贷款成员规模。Based on the examination of the reputation costs, group charateristics and operational environments of the Small and Medium Enterprises（SMEs） , this paper constructs a group lending reputation model for the SMEs to analyze how banks could set up reputation costs to reduce credit risks by transforming the traditional loan-repayment games between banks and the SMEs into the reputation games among the SMEs themselves. This study concludes： valid reputation costs are the institutional foundations of the SMEs＇group lending; reputation costs refer to the opportunity costs associated with the loss of privilege as a member conducting intra-group transactions due to default; the incentive conditions of banks endogenously define the market risk frontier; the group lending can extend the maximum market risk of bank loans; Under the multiple- player group lending, banks need to trade off between the benefits of expanding market risk limits and the shortcomings of increasing credit risks so as to determine the optimal member size of the multiple-player group lending.

关 键 词：动态重复博弈 子博弈完美均衡 联保贷款 信誉成本 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F276.3F224.32