新农合倒筹资体制及补偿效果问题研究  

Reverse Fundraising System and Compensation Effect of the NRCMS

作　　者：韩晓建[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学,天津300222

出　　处：《河北工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2010年第4期27-31,共5页Journal of Hebei University of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：本文从我国现阶段新型农村合作医疗制度介绍出发,主要分析了筹资体制及补偿效果存在的问题:一是倒筹资体制的不稳定性。不利于形成稳定筹资机制,影响制度的可持续发展。二是普遍补贴模式的不合理性。资金过于分散,单笔补偿数额低,补偿效果差,患大病农民"因病致贫,因病返贫"的矛盾仍然突出。进而提出了四项改进措施,相对于现行做法,这样将大大增强制度吸引力,调动农民参保积极性,实现制度可持续发展。This paper firstly introduces the NRCMS（New Rural Cooperative Medical System） and mainly analyses the problems of the financing system and compensation effect： the first problem is the instability of the reverse fundraising system which goes against stable fundraising system and sustainable development.The second problem,then,is the irrationality of the general allowance mode,such as capital decentralizing,the low single compensation and unsatisfactory effects.As a result,farmers are still likely to get poor again because of some serious diseases.This paper puts forward four measures to make the system more appealing,make the farmers more actively participate in social insurance and finally achieve sustainable development of the system.

关 键 词：新农合 倒筹资 大病集中补贴 

分 类 号：C913.7[经济管理]