后“土地财政”时代地方财政收入行为风险研究——基于财政社会学的视角  

Local Fiscal Behavior Risks Research in Post-"Land Finance" Period:Based on Finance Social Science Perspective

作　　者：贺蕊莉[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学地方财政研究中心,大连116025

出　　处：《农业经济问题》2011年第1期95-99,112,共5页Issues in Agricultural Economy

基　　金：辽宁省教育厅项目(编号:2009JD18)成果之一

摘　　要：在土地需求能力和供给成本的相互作用下,地方财政的土地出让金收入依赖于节节攀升的房价,土地性税收依赖于活跃的楼市交易。后土地财政时代地方政府财政收入行为中最具风险的行为是扩大拆迁规模、过度举债和滥用税收排斥,在维系租金型收入制度的同时,滥用公债型收入制度、损害税收型制度。应建立地方税体系缓解地方财政收入冲动,同时要限制城市拆迁规模、加强对地方政府约束、规范税收管理、加大公共住房建设力度。Fiscal revenue system is divided into six categories by finance social science,and land finance belongs to typical rent-typed fiscal revenue system.Under the interplay between land demand and land supply costs,transferring fund of land revenue from land finance rely on escalating house price,land tax revenue depends on active house market transaction.In post-land finance period,the most risky behavior of local governments are dislocation scale expansion,excessive debts and tax exclusion abuse,while maintaining rent-typed fiscal system,misusing bond-typed revenue system and to the detriment of tax-typed revenue system.This paper suggests that establishing local tax system to relieve local finance reliance on land,limiting urban dislocation scales,strengthening local governmental restrains,standardizing tax ministration,increasing public house constructions.

关 键 词：地方财政 土地财政 财政收入制度 财政社会学 社会风险 

分 类 号：F301[经济管理—产业经济] F812.4