信息不对称条件下我国医疗服务价格激励性监管模式研究  

Under the Condition of Asymmetric Information,the Research of Incentive Regulation Model about Chinese Service Price

作　　者：汤少梁[1] 陈峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京中医药大学经贸管理学院,南京210046

出　　处：《价值工程》2011年第4期123-124,共2页Value Engineering

基　　金：江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究项目(项目编号:2010SJB630054);江苏省2010年度江苏省社会科学基金项目(项目编号:10GLD018)阶段性成果

摘　　要：目前我国医疗服务市场存在严重的信息不对称问题,是导致我国医疗服务价格监管失灵的一个主要原因。本文借鉴西方主要的三种规避信息不对称的激励性监管模式的优点,在投资回报率价格监管模式的基础上,引入了价格上限因子和标准监管价格,同时考虑了医疗服务成本、医疗服务质量等因素,构建了我国医疗服务价格的监管模式,并对该模式进行了总结和评价。At present,there are serious asymmetric information problems in the Chinese medical service market,which is also the main reason leading regulatory failures on prices of Chinese medical service.Borrowing ideas from three main kinds of western regulatory models avoiding the risks of asymmetric information,we construct the incentive regulatory model about the prices of Chinese medical service.On the basis of rate of return regulatory model,this model introduces the price-cap factor and yardstick regulatory price,and also considers some factors such as medical service price,medical service cost.At last,we summarize and evaluate this model.

关 键 词：信息不对称 监管模式 医疗服务价格 

分 类 号：R2[医药卫生—中医学]