多轮密封拍卖中的歧视价和均一价的实验分析  

Experimental Studies of Disciminatory-price Versus Uniform-price Multiple Round Sealed-bid Auction

作　　者：王婷婷[1] 秦向东[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《科学技术与工程》2011年第1期228-232,共5页Science Technology and Engineering

摘　　要：有的多物品拍卖市场上只有一个垄断卖家同时拍卖多个同质物品,同时竞争性的竞标者一次只能竞拍一件标的物,比如上海私车额度拍卖市场。在这种拍卖市场上,歧视价的拍卖方式常常被采用。有不少研究讨论了不同拍卖机制下歧视价和均一价对拍卖结果产生的影响。但多轮密封拍卖的方式很少被涉及到。根据上海市私车额度拍卖市场的真实情况,在采用私人价值模型的情况下,设计四组拍卖实验。通过保持其他变量不变,考察在多轮密封拍卖的机制下,歧视价和均一价的拍卖会对竞标者的出价行为产生怎样的影响,同时比较两种机制下卖家收益的大小及拍卖效率的高低,另外对部分实验结果进行讨论并且分析产生该结果的原因。In some multi-unit auction markets,there is one monopolistic seller and many units of items offered for sale.Meanwhile competitive bidders only can bid one unit of item at a time.The auction license plate for private car in Shanghai is quite typical.Discriminatory price auction has been used quite often in such market.Under some classic auction format,a lot of researches have considered the different influence on bidding results between discriminatory price and uniform price.But multiple round sealed-bid auction is rarely involved.Holding other variables constant,we could check the different influence on bidding behavior between discriminatory price and uniform price multiple round auction,meanwhile compare the seller＇s revenue and bidding efficiency under these two mechanisms.

关 键 词：多轮密封拍卖 歧视价 均一价 

分 类 号：F713.359[经济管理—产业经济]