我国食品行业事后监管失灵的博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of After-Event Regulatory Failure of China's Food Industry

作　　者：廖卫东[1] 肖仁华[2] 左聪颖[3] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学经济学院,江西南昌330013 [2]中山大学岭南学院,广东广州510275 [3]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100872

出　　处：《当代财经》2011年第2期84-89,共6页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(07CJY047);教育部人文社会科学项目(07JC790079)

摘　　要：近年来,我国食品安全问题层出不穷,愈演愈烈,通过构建食品生产厂商与监管者之间的完全信息动态博弈模型,计算出子博弈精炼纳什均衡解,即厂商选择过度造假,监管者事后过度监管。结论与我国食品行业事后监管模式的现实后果高度吻合,具有很强的解释力,并且将其与帕累托最优解相比较,说明了次优均衡产生的原因。In recent years,issues concerning food safety have been emerging one after the other and are getting more and more serious.By constructing the dynamic game model of complete information between food manufacturers and regulators,this paper works out the solution to the sub-game refined Nash equilibrium,i.e.the excessive frauds from manufacturers and over-regulation afterwards from the authority.The conclusion of the study highly coincides with the reality of China＇s afterward regulatory mode in the food industry,so that it has a strong power to give explanations.When it is compared with Pareto optimal solution,the causes of sub-optimal equilibrium can be illustrated.

关 键 词：造假因子 监管系数 完全信息动态博弈 

分 类 号：F426[经济管理—产业经济]