城市基础设施项目市场化融资研究——基于专用性投资不足的视角  

The Financing Marketing of Urban Infrastructure Projects:Based on the Perspective of Insufficient Specific Investment

作　　者：王立国[1] 武文婷[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学投资工程管理学院工程管理研究中心,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《城市发展研究》2011年第1期120-124,共5页Urban Development Studies

基　　金：地方政府融资问题研究;国家社会科学基金项目(09CJY011);基础设施投融资激励机制设计;教育部人文社科项目(09YJC790031)

摘　　要：在我国基础设施项目市场化融资中,由于地方政府与民间资本之间签订的特许经营协议为不完全合同,导致双方均倾向于专用性投资不足。为了实现城市基础设施市场化融资的健康发展,本文利用"拿住"理论,对专用性投资不足进行分析,并从完善政府监管体制、加强特许经营协议管理等方面提出解决专用性投资不足的对策。In the process of the financing marketing of infrastructure projects in China,the franchise agreement signed by local government and nongovernmental enterprises is an incomplete contract that leads to insufficient specific investment from both parties.In order to analyze the insufficient specific investment in urban infrastructures＇ financing marketing,I use the ＂hold up＂ theory to build a model.Further on,some suggestions are raised basing on the model from the views of perfecting the government regulation system and strengthening management of franchising agreements.

关 键 词：城市基础设施 市场化融资 专用性投资 “拿住”理论 

分 类 号：F291.1[经济管理—国民经济]