农村信用社惜贷现象的博弈分析  

Analysis of "Unwilling to Loan" of Rural Credit Union under Game Theory

作　　者：韩秀兰[1] 

机构地区：[1]中北大学人文社会科学学院,山西太原030051

出　　处：《北京邮电大学学报（社会科学版）》2010年第6期84-87,共4页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：中北大学校青年科技基金项目(20090813)

摘　　要：从农村信用社和农户之间的信息不对称入手,构建博弈模型来分析农村信用社在向农户提供贷款时出现的4种均衡结果,即信贷市场部分成功的合并均衡、信贷市场完全成功的分开均衡、信贷市场完全失败的合并均衡以及信贷市场接近失败的混合策略均衡。分析了农村信用社在向农户贷款时惧贷、惜贷的原因,同时提出了实行市场利率,完善信用制度,引进贷款代理人制度等相应的政策建议。Under the condition of information asymmetry, through constructing game model, this article analyzes four equilibrium results when the rural credit union makes credit and loans to farmers. The four equilibrium results are respectively the partly successful pooling equilibrium of credit market, the entirely successful detaching equilibrium of credit market, entirely failing combination equilibrium of credit market and the nearly failing mixed strategy equilibrium of credit market. Then, the article analyzes the reasons why rural credit union is unwilling to loan to farmer. In the end, the article brings forth related suggestions such as following market interest rate, perfecting credit system and introducing the loan deputy system.

关 键 词：农村信用社 农户 惜贷 

分 类 号：F830.41[经济管理—金融学] F830.58