对中国天然橡胶产业补贴的博弈分析  

China's Natural Rubber Industry Subsidies Game

作　　者：张赛丽[1] 柯佑鹏[1] 许能锐[1] 过建春[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济与管理学院,海南海口570228 [2]琼州学院,海南三亚572000

出　　处：《林业经济问题》2010年第6期535-539,共5页Issues of Forestry Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(08BJY088);国家自然科学基金项目(70863002);国家软科学基金项目(2007GXQ4D183);国家软科学基金项目(2006GXS2D090);海南省自然科学基金项目(70745);海南省教育厅科研资助研究基金项目(Hjsk2008-06)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：加入WTO后,中国减少征收天然橡胶进口关税,为此中国天然橡胶产业将面临进口胶的巨大冲击:中国天然橡胶的比较优势较弱,进口贸易依存度逐年增加。本研究通过建立博弈模型来分析政府对中国天然橡胶产业补贴的策略选择,分析发现,政府的补贴对中国天然橡胶产量起促进作用,而对东南亚国家天然橡胶产量起抑制作用。当东南亚国家天然橡胶生产厂商选择高价格策略时,中国政府选择补贴国内良种种植、高新技术割胶等生产厂商;当东南亚国家选择低价格策略时,中国政府选择补贴普通民营胶农。After joining the WTO,China has reduced import tariffs to imports of natural rubber,and the natural rubber industry will face a huge impact：the comparative advantages of natural rubber in China is weak,dependence on imports has increased year by year.To analyze the government subsidies to China＇s strategy selection on the natural rubber industry,this paper established the game model and has found that：the government subsidies on China＇s natural rubber output play a catalytic role,and which is the opposite to the output of natural rubber from Southeast Asian countries.When the manufacturers of natural rubber in Southeast Asia selected the high-price strategy,the Chinese government chose to subsidize the domestic seed cultivation and the high-tech manufacturers;and when the Southeast Asian countries to low-price strategy,Chinese government chose to subsidize the ordinary private rubber farmers.

关 键 词：天然橡胶 政府补贴 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F326.25[经济管理—产业经济]