人工智能机器发现系统是对强纲领的经验拒斥吗?——评析围绕计算机模拟科学发现所引发的争论  

Do the Computational Discovery Systems Demonstrate an Empirical Refutation of the Strong Programme? An Analysis of the Debate Arising out of the Computer Simulation of Scientific Discovery

作　　者：王小红[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学分析》2010年第4期132-145,共14页Philosophical Analysis

摘　　要：计算论者以人工智能系统模拟科学发现作为反对强纲领的经验实例,引起了一场围绕科学发现是否完全由社会因素因果决定的激烈争论。这场争论是众多对SSK的批评之一,但它的发生视角不同以往,它关注科学发现这个主题。争论中出现的社会学主义的科学发现观和心智主义的科学发现观分歧的关键在于是否能把内部社会情境和外部社会情境区分开来。AI系统的重新发现证明了区分两种社会因素而不是模糊两种社会情境的合理性,示例了哲学史上某些长期有争议的问题的一些结果以及社会学的限度。Computationalists took the computational discovery systems in AI as an empirical refutation to the ‘strong programme’. This brought forth a debate on whether scientific dis- coveries were totally causally determined by social factors. This paper analyzes in details what the ideas of mentalism and sociologism on scientific discoveries are respectively, and unfolds the key cause of their divergences is whether to distinguish two kinds of social con- texts or not. That is intrinsic/extrinsic social factors. We give our viewpoints about the results and the meanings of this debate. Meanwhile, through analyzing on the heuristics, we conclude that AI system’s rediscovery justified the rationality to distinguish two social factors. We could not separate the real scientist from the broader social contexts, but we can do through the AI programs. Moreover, AI programs can instantiate some results of those controversies in the long history of philosophical debating.

关 键 词：科学发现 强纲领 人工智能 

分 类 号：TP18[自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程] N02[自动化与计算机技术—控制科学与工程]