创业企业创新与风险投资最优退出方式选择  

Innovation of Start-ups and Venture Capital Exits

作　　者：吴江林[1] 柏政成[1] 周孝华[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2011年第2期58-63,共6页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

摘　　要：针对风险投资过程中创业企业创新度对风险投资退出方式的影响,在考虑风险投资三阶段的基础上,基于具有线性需求函数的纵向产品差异化市场,通过引入产品创新度构建了风险投资家退出时收益最大化退出决策模型。研究表明:当创业企业的新产品创新度很大时,公开上市比出售(将创业企业出售给市场上的原垄断企业)更加有利。由于有私人收益的存在,企业家会通过提高产品创新度,来推动风险投资以公开上市的方式退出,这将会产生一个冲突。通过对控制权分配,得出最优的债权和股权比例,从而减轻这种冲突。Contraposing start-ups＇ depth of innovation on the impact of the exit way of venture capital,considering venture capital＇s three-stages,and based on a vertical product differentiation market with linear demand functions.In this paper,we develop a model on exit decision to maximize profit of venture capitalists investing in the depth of innovation.The results show： when the new product is sufficiently innovative,going public can be more profitable than a trade sale（selling the venture to the existing company）.This leads to an agency conflict if the entrepreneur enjoys private benefits from staying an independent manager in the company after the exit of the venture capitalist.Moreover,the entrepreneur has incentives to enhance the depth of innovation so as to make an IPO the preferred exit.We derive the optimal financing strategy under different allocations of control rights.The use of an optimal mix of debt and equity can partially mitigate such a conflict.

关 键 词：风险投资 退出决策 创新 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]