市场势力、煤电矛盾与潜在福利损失--来自上市公司的经验证据  

Market Power,Confliction between Coal and Electricity and Potential Welfare Lost——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：张占东[1] 张铭慎[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南财经政法大学国际经济贸易学院,河南郑州450011

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2011年第1期21-30,共10页Industrial Economics Research

摘　　要：多年来煤电矛盾一直困扰我国经济发展,且近年来呈加剧之势。煤电行业相对市场势力是分析煤电矛盾的关键环节,根据新经验产业组织学的分析框架和GMM方法估计了2005～2008年煤炭和火电行业的市场势力及煤电产业链的潜在福利损失。研究表明:煤炭、火电行业市场势力溢价分别为1.10和0.87,煤炭行业行使相对市场势力而火电行业因电价规制无法传导成本提高是造成煤电矛盾的重要原因;煤电产业链的潜在福利损失平均相当于当年GDP的2.9%左右。In recent years the confliction between coal and electricity always obsessed the development of economy and it has the aggravating trend. The paper argues that comparative market power is the key problem in the analysis of this confliction. Then the paper estimates the market power of coal and electricity industry during the period from 2005 to 2008 with the method of GMM in the framework of NEIO, and evaluates the potential welfare lost. The result shows that the mark - up of coal and electricity are 1.10 and O. 87, so confliction between coal and electricity is resulting from coal industry undertakes the comparative market power but electricity industry can＇t transmit this cost increasing for products＇ price regularity. According to the result, the potential welfare lost is equivalent to the amount of GDP about 2.9%. Furthermore, we can get the conclusion that the coal industry is not real perfect competition. Also, we need to breakup the monopoly of railway transportation to allay the confliction between coal and electricity, but also judges and weighs in cautious on the horizontal integration of coal corporations.

关 键 词：市场势力 煤电矛盾 纵向约束 潜在福利损失 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]