财产保险公司客户转移模型与服务竞争囚徒困境  

Customer Switching Model and Prisoners' Dilemma of Service Competition between Property Insurance Companies

作　　者：孙树垒[1] 路晓伟 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学管理科学与工程学院,江苏南京210046 [2]中国大地财产保险股份有限公司,上海200001

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第1期22-26,共5页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：江苏省软科学项目(BR2008041)

摘　　要：阐述了财产保险市场中存在的保险公司不愿率先实施服务创新的"囚徒困境"问题,认为保险公司服务竞争的内在激励不足,是由于服务创新存在外部性。通过建立一个客户转移模型,给出了客户在低服务质量保险公司投保时间与出险概率之间的关系,剖析了服务竞争"囚徒困境"的产生机理,并提出了针对性的服务竞争策略。There is a phenomenon of ＂prisoners＇ dilemma＂ in property insurance market that insurance companies are unwilling to innovate service.This paper expatiates this kind of ＂prisoners＇ dilemma＂ of service competition and brings out an option that inherent shortage of incentive for service innovating of property insurance companies is resulted from externalities of service innovating.Through constructing a model of customer switching,relationship between time of buying insurance from insurance companies with low service quality and accident probability,and occurring mechanism of ＂prisoners＇ dilemma＂ of service competition are discovered.Finally,pertinent strategies about service competition are proposed.

关 键 词：财产保险 客户转移 MARKOV过程 服务竞争 

分 类 号：F840.3[经济管理—保险]