政治转型中行为者策略互动分析  

Strategy Analysis on Actors' Interction in Political Transformation

作　　者：陈永国[1] 王小青[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学国际与公共事务学院,上海200030 [2]中山大学岭南学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2011年第1期13-19,共7页Journal of Shanghai Jiao tong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金青年项目"中国意识形态转型进程的测度研究"(10YJC810005)

摘　　要：更为形式化定量的动态博弈树方法可以对政治转型中的行为者--政府与反对派策略互动展开分析。考虑两种政府的价值偏好,一种是当现政府谋求永远执政地位时与反对派策略互动方式,二是当现政府并不谋求永久执政,而谋求定期执政时与反对派策略互动方式,进而讨论分析这两种目标所带来的转型路径的差异,弥补现有行为者方法的诸多不足,得出了一些有价值的结论。The dynamic game tree method is a more formalized quantitative analysis approach for actors of strategic interaction game in political transformation between the government and the opposition. Two transformation targets, that is, the value preferences of the government were explored ： one is the interactive game pattern when the government authorities buck for the permanent governance; the other is the interactive game pattern when the government administration strives for the short term interest instead of the eternal reign. Subsequently, differences of transformation paths brought about by the two different target were expounded, to offset the deficiency of the approach of actors. Ultimately, a number of valuable conclusions were reached.

关 键 词：政治转型 行为者方法 政府 反对派 策略互动 

分 类 号：D0[政治法律—政治学]