中国私人银行业务监管方案设计  

Study on China' s Supervision Scheme of Private Banking Service

作　　者：喻旭兰[1] 董小星[1] 刘瑛 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学金融与统计学院,湖南长沙410079 [2]国家审计署境外审计司,北京100830

出　　处：《广东金融学院学报》2011年第1期90-99,119,共11页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70873037);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(201026)

摘　　要：在系统分析中国私人银行业务的委托代理问题和公司治理失效成因的基础上,从私人银行关系契约的本质出发,设计出中国私人银行业务监管方案,即通过法律法规形式,在私人银行内部设立保护私人客户利益的公共代表,实施该业务的最优监管方案;并从宏观层面创造私人银行最优监管方案顺利实施的监管环境;同时,通过私人银行自律监管和银监会监管的紧密结合,提升最优监管方案的效果。Based on the nature of contractual relationships of private hanks, this paper started from the performance, analyzing the Principal -Agent relation and the reason of corporate governance failure of private banking service in China. The optimal supervision scheme of private banking service has been worked out by setting up public representatives on behalf of the interests of customers in private banking, implementing the optimal regulatory scheme. Creating the smooth regulatory environment of this service and combining the administrative supervision and self-regulation are also very important to enhance the effect of the optimal supervision scheme.

关 键 词：私人银行业务 委托代理问题 公司治理失效 最优监管方案 

分 类 号：F830.35[经济管理—金融学]