效率工资理论中的监督成本问题  

On the Issue of Monitoring Cost in Efficient Wage Theory

作　　者：孙敏[1] 严维石[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学,广州510000 [2]广东商学院,广州510080

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2011年第2期137-139,共3页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：广东商学院国民经济研究中心的委托项目"效率工资理论的修正"的阶段性成果

摘　　要：在梳理效率工资理论相关理论文献基础上,本文研究效率工资理论中的监督成本问题。与现有效率工资理论不同的是,本文认为,失业并不是由雇主支付高于市场均衡工资所致,而是雇员的过度劳动引发的,在竞争劳动市场条件下,雇员劳动边际产出价值支付雇主的监督成本和雇员自身的劳动薪酬,作为回报,雇主给予雇员持续的、认可的工作条件和环境。在这交换中,雇员将出现超过一般强度的过度劳动。On the basis of analyzing hterature on the efficient wage theory, the paper studies the issue of supervising cost in efficient wage theory. Different from current efficient wage theory, the paper argues that unemployment is not caused by employers＇overpayment than the market equilibrium wage, but by employees＇ overworking. In a competitive labor market, the marginal product value of employee＇s labor pays for employer＇s monitoring cost and employee＇s wage. And as repay for this, employer provides employee with the consistent and agreed working condition and enviroranent. In exchange, employee tends to overwork.

关 键 词：监督成本 过度劳动 失业 

分 类 号：F061.3[经济管理—政治经济学]