隐藏行动模型中成本加酬金合同的激励机制  

Incentive Mechanism of Cost Plus Fee Contract on Hidden Action

作　　者：杨增海[1] 张云波[1] 章凌云[1] 汪静[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学土木工程学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《华侨大学学报（自然科学版）》2011年第2期238-240,共3页Journal of Huaqiao University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国务院侨办科研基金资助项目(06Q0052);福建省自然科学基金资助项目(E9910026)

摘　　要：以成本加酬金合同为基础,建立合同激励模型.模型考虑了项目的工期及成本变量,在隐藏行动的条件下,得出业主与承包商的收益函数.通过对模型推导及求解可知,好或坏的结果给承包商带来的利益差额与承包商受到的激励强度成正比;最优激励强度与利润增加对额外努力的敏感性正相关,而与绝对风险厌恶系数、外界环境影响方差,以及有关活动选择的判断力负相关.Based on the cost plus fee contracts,the contract incentive model is established by applying the principal-agent theory in the information economics.The model includes the duration and the cost of the project,obtains the revenue function of both the owner and the contractor under the condition of hidden action.To maximize owner and contractor total revenue under the condition that contractor can meet the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraints,the owner′s optimal incentive intensity is obtained,the correlation between incentive intensity and other parameters is presented by the model.

关 键 词：工程合同 隐藏行动 激励模型 成本 酬金 

分 类 号：TU723[建筑科学—建筑技术科学] F284[经济管理—国民经济]