基于企业管理者信用的道德风险防控机制——华夏银行私营企业主贷款的演变  

Prevention and Control Mechanism of Moral Hazard Based on Enterprise Ownership Credit-Huaxia Bank Private Enterprise Ownership Loan Evolvement

作　　者：顾延善[1] 赵映光[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行青岛市中心支行,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《金融发展研究》2011年第1期36-40,共5页Journal Of Financial Development Research

摘　　要：本文根据委托代理关系下的道德风险以及管理者组织属性理论,分析了华夏银行私营企业主贷款防控道德风险的内在逻辑。以企业管理者信用代替企业信用为起点,通过银行和企业主之间的博弈和互动,对企业主信用进行培育,最终实现企业信用回归,从而克服了中小型私营企业在发展初期的道德风险问题。Based on the moral hazard in agency relationship and the organizational attribution theory,this article analyzes the inner logic of private enterprise ownership loan of Huaxia bank to prevent and control moral hazard.Substituting business credit with enterprise owner＇s credit is the start point of the logic which evolves through the game and interaction between bank and enterprise owner,and finally the business credit will return so as to control the moral hazard in the initial phase of SMEs.

关 键 词：道德风险 管理者信用 企业信用回归 重复博弈 

分 类 号：F832.42[经济管理—金融学]