财产保险市场违规行为监管博弈与检查策略分析  

Analysis of Supervisive Game and Checking Strategy for Illegal Behaviour in Property Insurance Market

作　　者：孙树垒[1] 路晓伟 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学管理科学与工程学院,江苏南京210046 [2]中国大地财产保险股份有限公司,上海200135

出　　处：《保险职业学院学报》2011年第1期11-14,共4页Journal of Insurance Professional College

基　　金：南京财经大学校级重点课题(B0805);江苏省软科学项目(BR2008041)

摘　　要：财产保险市场违规行为监管是我国现阶段保险监管的一项重要工作。为揭示违规行为监管过程中保险公司与监管机关的互动行为,本文构建了财产保险市场违规行为监管博弈模型,结合模型的混合策略均衡,提出并分析了财产保险违规行为监管检查策略,以促进监管方式的改进和监管效率的提升。Supervision on illegal behaviors in Chinese property insurance market is an important task nowadays. In order to disclose the interaction behaviors of each other during supervision on illegal behaviors, this paper constructs a model for supervision game on illegal behaviors in property insurance market. Based on the mixed strategy equilibrium of the model, inspection strategies in supervision on illegal behaviors in property insurance market are proposed out and analyzed deeply in order to upgrade supervision method and improve supervision efficiency.

关 键 词：财产保险 监管博弈 检查策略 混合均衡 

分 类 号：F840.3[经济管理—保险]