信用评级对银行与中小企业间信贷博弈的改进──以广东省佛山市为例  

Positive Effects of Credit Rating on the Games between Banks and Small-and Medium-sized Enterprises——a Case Study of Foshan City in Guangdong Province

作　　者：李喜梅[1] 张家潮[1] 彭云[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院国民经济与金融发展研究所,广东广州510200

出　　处：《湖南商学院学报》2011年第1期70-75,共6页Journal of Hunan Business College

摘　　要：本文构建了一个银行与中小企业间的信贷博弈模型,分析双方行为选择,认为银企间的信息不对称导致他们之间的信贷业务较难达成,而信用评级却能起到双方信息传导器的作用,但信用评级的公信力不高是现实问题。以广东省佛山市政府支持下的信用评级为例,分析政府支持下的信用评级对银企信贷博弈的改进,并就政府退出承担评级费用后的信用评级发展提出了一些建议。The paper establishes a credit game model for the bank and small-and medium-sized enterprises,analyzes the behavioral options and holds that the information asymmetry between them leads to the failure of their agreement on credit loans,while credit rating system can work as an information transmitter,although it has low public confidence force.The paper makes a case study on the credit rating in Foshan city and analyzes the improvements on the credit loan game with the support of the government,and offers suggestions on the development of the system after the withdrawal of government financial support.

关 键 词：信贷博弈 信用评级 公信力 中小企业 银行 

分 类 号：F832.42[经济管理—金融学]