执法成本、政企合谋与煤矿安全——基于中国煤矿安全事故的实证分析  

Enforcement cost,collusion between government and enterprise,and coal mine safety——positive analysis based on coalmine mishaps caused in China

作　　者：赵文霞[1] 潘博 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心,辽宁大连116025 [2]大连市浦发银行,辽宁大连116001

出　　处：《大连海事大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第1期56-60,共5页Journal of Dalian Maritime University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：辽宁省教育厅创新团队项目(WT2010015);辽宁省科技厅软科学项目(2008401035)

摘　　要：在委托代理模型的基础上,以2008年发生的煤矿安全事故为样本,运用Logit模型分析煤炭行业政企合谋的防范机制以及影响合谋导致安全事故的因素。结果显示:煤矿企业产出与企业性质对合谋导致事故发生具有显著影响,其中,发生安全事故的煤矿企业产出越大,该事故越有可能是由于规制者与煤矿企业之间的合谋,而国有煤矿产出的增加可以抵消其国有性质对合谋导致概率的正向影响。同时,通过把煤矿企业的产量决策以及地方政府的执法成本引入模型,为理解政企合谋与煤矿安全事故之间的关系提供证据。Based on the principal-agent model and the sample data of coalmine mishaps caused in 2008,the paper used the Logit model to acquire a collusion-proof mechanism between government and enterprise and to analyze the facts that affect collusion which leads to coalmine mishap.The results show that coal companies＇ productivity and the enterprises＇ state-owned nature have a significant effect on the probability that collusion results in the accident,in which the bigger capacity the company has,the more likely the accident results from the collusion between the local government and the coal mine firms;the scale of state-owned coal mining enterprises may offset the positive impact on the probability induced by their state-owned nature.Meanwhile,through introducing the coal companies＇ output decision and the government＇s enforcement cost to the model,the paper provided evidence for understanding the relationship between collusion and the mining mishap.

关 键 词：执法成本 政企合谋 煤矿安全 委托代理模型 

分 类 号：F407.21[经济管理—产业经济]