天然气开发地与中央政府气量博弈研究  

Research on Game Theory of Natural Gas Supply Distribution between Gas Development District Governments and Central Government

作　　者：王川[1] 程宏伟[1] 周国栋 

机构地区：[1]成都理工大学管理科学学院,四川成都610059 [2]中国石油西南油气田公司天然气经济研究所,四川成都610051

出　　处：《天然气技术与经济》2011年第1期9-12,77,共4页Natural Gas Technology and Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"矿产资源开发利益统筹与西部地区科学发展研究"(批准号:09XJY002);四川省哲学社会科学重点研究基地四川石油天然气发展研究中心重点项目"天然气产业链协调发展对策研究--以川渝地区为例"(批准号:川油气科SKA08-03);成都理工大学优秀创新团队计划"资源企业管理工程评价方法与应用"

摘　　要：组织结构决定了天然气资源开发的利益分配结构,但现行利益结构存在着多种矛盾,其中中央与地方间的矛盾尤为突出。为了研究两者间有关利益分配的问题,从博弈论角度,建立了天然气开发地政府与中央政府关于气量分配的博弈模型,并以四川达州天然气开发为例分析两者间的博弈过程。模型表明,双方博弈过程存在两个纳什均衡点,具体达到哪个均衡,由双方的博弈能力而定,并且地方投资需合理计划,避免盲目投资,出现投资过剩的情况。The benefits distribution structure of natural gas development is determined by organizational structure. However, there are all kinds of contradictions existing in current benefits distribution structure, among which, contradictions between gas development district governments and central government is getting outstanding. To discuss the relationships between on benefits distribution, a game model based on game theory is set up. The application of the model with the case of Dazhou natural gas development shows, there are two Nash equilibrium points during the gaming process and which equilibrium point will be achieve is determined by game ability competition between the tow levels of government. Moreover, local governments are suggested to make rational investment plan to avoid indiscriminate investment and overinvestment.

关 键 词：天然气 开发地政府 中央政府 利益矛盾 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F426.22[经济管理—产业经济]