基于博弈论的农产品质量安全监管分析  

Analysis on agro-products quality and safety supervision based on game theory

作　　者：李宗泰[1] 何忠伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京农学院经济管理学院,北京102206

出　　处：《北京农学院学报》2011年第1期30-32,共3页Journal of Beijing University of Agriculture

基　　金：北京哲学社科规划重点项目"基于供应链的北京农产品质量安全管理模式研究"(09AbJG296);北京市属市管高等学校人才强教计划项目

摘　　要：运用博弈理论分析农产品质量安全监管问题。研究表明,经济利益(收入、成本和罚款)预期是决定生产经营者和监管者策略选择的重要因素。因此,要保证农产品质量安全,应该降低两者从事农产品质量安全活动的成本;加大对生产经营者制售伪劣农产品的处罚力度,杜绝其机会主义行为;加大对监管者消极监管的处罚力度,增加其作为的压力。The paper analyzes the regulation of the quality and safety of Agro-products based on game theory.The study shows that the expectation of economic benefits（income,cost and penalty） is the key factor for strategy selection of producers,business operators and supervisions.Therefore,in order to ensure the quality and safety of agro-products,it is important to reduce the costs of producers,business operators and supervisions when they adopt activities that raising the quality and safety of Agro-products,intensify punishment on producing and selling of inferior quality Agro-products to curb opportunism behaviors of producers and business operators as well as intensify punishment on passive supervision to put efficiency pressure on supervisors.

关 键 词：农产品 质量安全 监管 博弈 

分 类 号：F304.3[经济管理—产业经济]