税收征管目标及征纳双方的博弈分析  被引量:3

Game Playing Analysis of Taxpayer and Tax Collector and the Target of Administration of Tax Collection

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作  者:梁军[1] 

机构地区:[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院,北京100872

出  处:《税务与经济》2011年第2期95-97,共3页Taxation and Economy

摘  要:目前,国内关于税收征管目标有两种代表性观点:一是促使纳税人依法纳税;二是提高税收征管的质量和效率。应该同时吸收两种观点的合理要素,将税收征管目标重新界定为税收成本与税收流失总和最小化。在税收征纳关系中,税务机关追求的是税收成本与税收流失总和最小化,而纳税人追求的是自身利益最大化,两者根据对方的策略,做出符合各自目标的策略选择,从而形成税收征纳博弈关系。There are two typical viewpoints about the target of administration of tax collection in China. One is to encourage the taxpayers to pay taxes according to the law. The other is to improve the quality and efficiency of tax collection. In fact, it is better to combine the reasonable parts of these two views and consider the minimum of the sum of tax cost and tax loss as the main target. In this way, those tax authorities will strive for the mini- mum of the sum of tax cost and tax loss, while taxpayers will maximize their own interests. Two parties will make good choices according to their own targets, then the game playing analysis comes into being.

关 键 词:税收征管目标 税收成本 税收流失 混合策略纳什均衡 

分 类 号:F810.423[经济管理—财政学]

 

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