Coca-Cola＇s Proposed Acquisition of Huiyuan： Revisiting the MOFCOM Decision  

作　　者：黄坤 张昕竹 

机构地区：[1]Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences （CASS） [2]Special-Term Professor of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics [3]Director and Professor of Center for Regulation and Competition, CASS

出　　处：《China Economist》2011年第2期127-136,共10页中国经济学人（英文版）

摘　　要：This paper revisits the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan case, using quantitative methods. We first estimate the demand system of carbonated soft drinks and juices, using the data of the 4-digit code Chinese soft drink industry. We then define the relevant market by implementing the SSNIP test （a.k.a. the hypothetical monopolist test）. Finally, we evaluate the unilateral effect on the juices market with merger simulation. Our results show that carbonated soft drinks and juicess are in two separate relevant markets. More importantly, there may, be a significant unilateral effect on the juices market based on scenario analysis. 7his result confirms the MOFCOM decision itself, but highlights that competition damage comes more from unilateral efect than from the dubious portfolio effect.

关 键 词：ANTITRUST relevant market de jinition unilateral effect merger simulation 

分 类 号：F471.268[经济管理—产业经济] F752.1