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作 者:汤吉军[1]
机构地区:[1]吉林大学中国国有经济研究中心,吉林长春130012
出 处:《中国人口·资源与环境》2011年第3期1-4,共4页China Population,Resources and Environment
基 金:教育部人文社会科学项目(No.09YJA790082);国家社会科学基金项目(No.08CJY021);吉林大学"985"工程项目
摘 要:本文运用产业组织理论分析环境污染所带来的福利影响,与传统经济理论形成鲜明的对照,为治理环境污染提供新的解决思路。虽然在大多数情况下完全竞争优于完全垄断,但是如果发生了市场失灵,对整个社会来说完全垄断就优于完全竞争。为此,本文针对不完全竞争市场结构的现实,进一步深入探讨环境污染外部性的福利效果,重新考察庇古税和科斯定理作用的约束条件。虽然我们依据完全竞争市场与负外部性会得到产生过多污染的结论,其解决方法是征收等于外部性的边际社会成本的税收,但这并不适用于不完全竞争市场,甚至是错误的。因此从负外部性角度看,我们发现不竞争市场结构可能产生高于或低于社会最优水平的产出和污染,虽然通过征税让企业负外部性内部化,竞争性市场的产量就是社会最优的水平,但这并不适合不完全竞争市场。因此,我们只有将市场势力、产权和庇古税有机结合起来,才能更现实地解决环境污染的负外部性问题,这对实现国民经济全面、协调与可持续发展具有非常重要的意义。In contrast to the traditional economic theory the paper is to analyze the negative environment externalities in terms of the industrial organization theory and provide the new resolutions. We discuss the negative pollution externalities in the imperfect market structure beyond the perfect market. Based on the traditional perfect market in the neoclassic economics, we show that both Coasiau theorem( property right) and Piguian taxation( government intervention) have a great positive effect on the firn~ production. However, because of the existence of both theories, which is implied by the perfect market, they tell us about the resolution to negative pollution externalities. Once we introduce imperfect market structure, including monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic competition, etc, we compare the welfare level under the negative pollution externalities. In principle, by means of market structure, we provide the solutions to the externalities governance, that is, taxation, property right and market structure to resolve the general externalities. They play an important role in China' s economic development and sustainability .
分 类 号:X506[环境科学与工程—环境工程]
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