监管监管者的理论基础及主要机制研究  

Study on the Necessity and Mechanisms of Supervision on Supervisors

作　　者：龚明华 刘鹏飞[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国银监会政策研究局 [2]中国人民大学财政金融学院

出　　处：《国际金融研究》2011年第3期74-82,共9页Studies of International Finance

基　　金：国家社科基金重大招标项目"中国金融监管制度优化设计研究"(09&ZD037)的阶段性成果之一

摘　　要：本文对信息不对称条件下监管监管者的理论基础及主要机制进行了文献梳理和初步研究。首先从信息不对称条件下的委托代理问题等三个方面综述了监管监管者的理论基础,并分别分析监管监管者的六个主要机制,最后,提出区分事前、事中和事后三个阶段并且有机结合的整体机制设计。This paper examines the theoretical basis and the principal mechanisms of how to supervise the supervisors,based on literature review in the context of information asymmetry.The first part summarizes the relevant supervision theories from three perspectives： the principal-agent issue under asymmetric information,the target of the supervisors and the theory of capture.Further on,six major mechanisms concerning how to supervise the supervisors are analyzed.Finally,the findings in this study suggest that a good integral mechanism design should not only incorporate and differentiate the ex-ante,proceeding and ex-post supervision,but also combine these processes together.

关 键 词：监管监管者 理论基础 主要机制 

分 类 号：F831[经济管理—金融学]