委托代理视角下的长贷短存合理性辨析  

Differentiation and Analysis of the Rationality of Long-Term Loans and Short-term Savings from the Perspective of Principal-Agent

作　　者：申建文[1,2] 王立平[3] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061 [2]中国人民银行西安分行,陕西西安710075 [3]西安邮电学院经济与管理学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《经济经纬》2011年第2期148-152,共5页Economic Survey

摘　　要：银行信贷资金营运中出现了典型的长贷短存现象,已成为理论界重点关注的课题之一。笔者运用委托代理理论,认为政府与银行总体目标函数统一,长贷短存是政府与银行间激励约束相容的委托代理良性机制在资金运作中的客观表现形式,具有合理性,根本上引发系统流动性风险较小,并提出继续推进银行改革以防范道德风险和逆向选择。There exists the phenomenon of both current account and medium -long term loans in the bank capital operation, which has become one of theoretical focus subjects. The authors apply the principal - agent theory and hold that the overall objective functions of the government and bank are unified and that the phenomenon is an objective and rational form of compatible incentive - restriction and benign principal - agent mechanism. It is less likely to cause liquidity risk fundamentally. The authors also put forward proposals about continuing bank reform to guard against moral risk and adverse selection.

关 键 词：委托代理 长贷短存 合理性 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]