存在腐败行为的扶贫资金监察进化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Supervision of Anti-poverty Capital with Corrupt Behavior

作　　者：唐华容[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵州财经学院马克思主义学院,贵州贵阳550004

出　　处：《安徽农业科学》2011年第4期2472-2475,共4页Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences

基　　金：默科合体R字[2010]LKC2032号

摘　　要：运用进化博弈理论研究存在腐败行为的扶贫资金监察问题,建立了对应的博弈模型,分析了下级官员和上级部门之间的行为选择,获得了各个博弈方的复制动态方程,探讨了博弈模型在不同情形下的进化稳定策略。研究结果表明,下级官员和上级部门在有限理性基础上得到的进化稳定策略与博弈双方的收益、系统所处的初始状态有关。并根据所提出的博弈模型,提出了合理性建议。The anti-poverty capital with corrupt behaviors supervision game model was studied by using the evolutionary game theory,and the corresponding game model was established,moreover,the behaviors choice between the junior official and the senior department were analyzed.Finally,the duplicative dynamic equation of each player in this game was obtained and the evolutionary stable strategy of this game model in different circumstances was investigated.The results showed that the evolutionary stable strategy of the junior official and the senior department based on bounded rationality depended on the payoff of each player and the initial state of the system.Finally,some reasonable advices based on the evolutionary game model were proposed.

关 键 词：扶贫资金 腐败行为 监察 进化博弈 复制动态方程 进化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]