政府对企业社会责任监管的双边博弈研究  

The Bilateral Game of Government's Supervision on Corporate Social Responsibility

作　　者：杨汝梁[1] 

机构地区：[1]萍乡高等专科学校,江西萍乡337000

出　　处：《萍乡高等专科学校学报》2011年第1期12-15,共4页Journal of Pingxiang College

摘　　要：企业社会责任是企业不能忽视的重要问题。由于"经济人"假设,企业追求利润最大化,必然逃避承担社会责任。因此,政府有必要加强监管,促使企业履行其社会责任。通过政府和企业的双边博弈,本文得出结论:增大相关政府部门的失职问责,能有效地促使企业按要求履行社会责任;而加重对企业不按要求履行社会责任的处罚,只会导致政府更加不履行职责。Corporate social responsibility is an inevitable problem.For the ＂economic person＂ hypothesis,it is natural for corporate to optimize profit and evade undertaking corporate social responsibility,thus,it is necessary for government to strengthen its supervision to make corporate undertaking the responsibility.By the bilateral game between government and corporate,we get the conclusion that the more severe punishment government gets for its breach of duty,the more responsibility corporate will undertake;while the more severe punishment corporate gets for its evasion of undertaking responsibility,the less duty government will take.

关 键 词：企业社会责任 政府 企业 双边博弈 

分 类 号：F123.15[经济管理—世界经济]