政府投资项目招投标模式研究——基于第二价格密封拍卖理论  

The Bidding Model of Government Project Based on Sealed Second Price Auction Theory

作　　者：诚然[1] 李琪[1] 韩锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200090

出　　处：《技术与创新管理》2011年第2期143-147,共5页Technology and Innovation Management

基　　金：上海市研究生创新基金资助项目(JWCXSL1002)

摘　　要：目前市场上的各种招投标方法往往难以实现预期目的的原因,是在于在一个不成熟、不健全的市场经济条件下,难免有人会去破坏招投标的游戏规则,从而造成了市场失灵、调控也失灵的尴尬局面。那么,如何实现经济性与公平性并举呢?在政府投资项目招投标中使用第二价格密封招标法,本着趋利避损的动机,投标人一定会按照其真实心理价格来报价,使得业主可以很好地克服其信息缺陷,在招标过程中占据主动,从而选择到最适合的承包商,更有效地优化资源配置。The reason why various bidding methods cannot reach the expected goal is that in an immature and unsound market,it is unavoidable for some people to violate the game rules,which results in malfunction of the market and regulation.How to achieve economical efficiency and fairness at the same time？ The Sealed Second Price Auction in government project bidding is the way,in which the bidders will bid a true price to be after profit and to avoid losses so that the business owners can solve the problem of lacking information and choose the most suitable contractors to optimize the allocation of resources.

关 键 词：第二价格密封拍卖理论 政府投资项目 招投标 串标 博弈分析 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]