第二价格密封拍卖理论框架下政府投资项目招投标模式改进研究  

A model Improvement of bidding in government investment projects under the second price seal auction theory frame

作　　者：诚然[1] 吴文升[1] 孙卓睿[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学,上海200090

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2011年第3期137-141,共5页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：上海市研究生创新基金资助项目(项目编号:JWCXSL1002)

摘　　要：在政府投资项目招投标过程中,招标人所面临的最大问题便是与投标人间的信息不对称。招标人发布招标信息,但却难以了解投标人的相关信息,而且由于投标人会利用招标人的信息缺陷寻求更多的利润,有意的隐蔽其真实心理价格几乎成为一种必然选择,在这种情况下,业主怎样突破困境寻找到对自身最有利的报价呢?可以将政府投资项目的招投标过程看作是第二价格密封拍卖的逆向形式,在这种情况下,本着趋利避损的动机,投标人往往会按照其真实心理价格来报价,使得业主可以较好地克服其信息缺陷,在招标过程中占据主动,从而选择到最适合的承包商,更有效地优化资源配置。In the bidding of government investment project,the most major problem which tenderee faces is the information asymmetry with bidder.The tenderee issues the tender information,but to obtain tenderer＇s related information is very difficult,moreover,because the tenderer will seek more profits in using the tenderee＇s information deficiency,to conceal its psychological price almost become the only choice,in this case,how should the owner break through the difficult position,and to seek the most advantageous quoted price for himself？We may regard the bidding of government investment project as the reverse form of the second price seal auction,in this case,in order to chase profits and avoid losses,tenderers will be in accordance with their true psychological price to offer,then the owners can overcome the information deficiencies,take the initiative in the tender process to select the most suitable contractor.

关 键 词：第二价格密封拍卖理论 政府投资项目 招投标 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F062.4[经济管理—政治经济学]