盈余质量影响投资效率的路径——基于双重代理关系的视角  

The Path of Earnings Quality's Influence over Capital Allocation Efficiency:Based on Double Agency Relationship

作　　者：黄欣然[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2011年第2期62-68,共7页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70872106);中国人民大学研究生科学研究基金项目(10XNH078)

摘　　要：在我国上市公司普遍存在投资效率低下的情况下,高质量的会计信息可以抑制无效投资行为,但是,会计信息会通过多种途径发挥作用。文章检验了管理层和大股东两类代理在会计信息改善投资效率过程中的中介作用。结果发现,盈余质量降低了管理层代理成本,进而有效抑制了企业的投资不足行为,盈余质量缓解了大股东的代理问题从而改善了企业的过度投资。同时发现,控股股东为了通过关联交易侵占上市公司的利益,需要在投资中掌握更多的控制性资源,导致了过度投资。Inefficiency investments are common in our listed companies.High-quality accounting information can inhibit this behavior.However,various ways will play a role.The intermediary roles of two types of agent-management and major shareholders-are examined in the process of accounting information to improve the investment efficiency.Results showed that earnings quality reduced management＇s agency costs,which constrained underinvestment behavior.And it also constrained overinvestment behavior by inhibiting major shareholder＇s agency.It is also found that controlling shareholders stolen the listed companies interests in the form of related party transactions within the investment decision-making,which promoted overinvestment behavior.

关 键 词：盈余质量 投资效率 投资过度 投资不足 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]