财政激励、晋升激励与地方官员的土地出让行为  

Fiscal Incentive,Political Incentive and Local Officials' Land Supply

作　　者：张莉[1,2] 王贤彬[3] 徐现祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院,广东广州510275 [2]中山大学经济研究所.广东广州510275 [3]广东外语外贸大学国际经济贸易学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2011年第4期35-43,共9页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“地方政府官员对地区经济发展的影响及机制研究”(批准号70803055);教育部人文社会科学研究项目“我国初次分配中的收入差距与成因”(批准号08JC790103);全国优秀博士学位论文作者2007年专项资金资助项目(批准号2007B04)

摘　　要：近年来,地方政府官员热衷于出让土地,现有文献主要强调土地财政。地方政府官员不仅面临财政激励而且还面临政治激励:在地方政府官员晋升以GDP为主要考核指标的激励下,地方政府官员有土地招商引资的动机。本文在理论上证明了,在一个政治集权经济分权的经济体,地方政府官员出让土地的"土地财政"和"土地引资"动机同时存在;在实证上,我们采用省级面板数据发现,地方政府官员热衷于出让土地是源于"土地引资",而非"土地财政"。本文的工作意味着,中国的土地问题是与土地市场之外的因素联动的,解决中国的土地问题需要土地市场之外的联动改革。Chinese local officials supplied much more land these years than before, and existing literatures look for the reason in the view of land finance. Actually, local officials are faced with fiscal incentive and political incentive simuhaneously. Local officials have the motive of attracting investment by land policy when central government evaluates them by economic performance. This paper theoretically proved that, in a political centralized and economic decentralized economy, local officials can make fiscal balance better and attract more capital investment by land supply; We then evidently found that the main incentive of land supply by local officials is investment promotion rather than fiscal balancing using Chinese provincial panel data. This finding means that China＇s land issues links with factors outside the land market, and linked reforms outside the land market are needed to solve China＇s land problems.

关 键 词：地方政府官员 土地供给 增长的政治经济学 

分 类 号：F061.3[经济管理—政治经济学]