两属性差异下的双寡头竞争选址策略  

A Location Game of Duopoly under two Multi-dimensional Differentiations of Product′s Properties

作　　者：许敏[1] 楚扬杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学理学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2011年第2期325-327,共3页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：中央高校研究生创新基金资助项目(2010-ZY-LX-026)

摘　　要：假设线性市场中存在不同偏好的顾客,建立了同类产品在横向差异和纵向差异同时存在条件下的双寡头企业两阶段动态博弈竞争选址模型。运用逆向归纳法求出各属性处于支配地位时的子博弈精炼纳什均衡解,并对均衡策略进行了比较分析。该模型拓广了传统决策选址模型的适用范围,弥补了决策选址模型的缺陷,使模型更具有实际意义。Under the assumption of different consumers′ preferences in the linear market,a two-stage dynamic and competition location game model for duopoly firms was proposed under horizontal and vertical property differences of a same kind product.The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of two-stage dynamic game was obtained by backward induction method when each property was dominant.And the strategies of equilibrium was analyzed.This model extends the scope of traditional location model and remedies its defect.It makes competition location game model more practical.

关 键 词：多维差异 HOTELLING模型 子博弈精炼纳什均衡 选址对策 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]