合同期限对寡头垄断电力市场均衡的影响分析  

Impact of Future Contract Duration on the Oligopoly Equilibrium in Electricity Contract Market

作　　者：陈冬青 杨鹏举 胡斌 

机构地区：[1]上海电力设计院有限公司,上海卢湾区200025

出　　处：《陕西电力》2011年第3期76-80,共5页Shanxi Electric Power

摘　　要：研究了在寡头垄断电力期货市场上,期货合同的期限如何对市场参与者之间的共谋产生影响。通过对期货合同作用的分析表明,合同对共谋的影响并不是绝对的,而是2种效应综合作用的结果,包括使脱离共谋者收入减少的收益损失效应,以及减少脱离共谋者损失的保护效应。建立了厂商共谋状态下的均衡模型,并且以均衡折现率来描述共谋均衡状态,通过分析合同期限与均衡折现率的关系,得出合同期限对市场共谋均衡的影响。研究表明,合同期限越长,厂商之间维持共谋就越困难,市场的竞争性也就越高。Based on the oligopoly electricity power market,a study is made on how the future contract will influence participants＇ collusion behaviors.The contract is considered to make combined impact resulting by two effects on the collusion market players,one of which is revenue reduction effect while the other is losses protection effect.An equilibrium model is built to describe the collusion behavior mathematically,where collusion equilibrium is reflected as a critical discount rate.Then the contract period＇s impact on collusion equilibrium is reached by analyzing relationship between contract duration and the critical discount rate.The result shows that the longer the contract period is,the more difficult for market participants to collude.

关 键 词：期货合同 共谋 寡头垄断 折现率 

分 类 号：TM715[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F123.9[经济管理—世界经济]