基于产品创新的企业R&D行为与定价策略研究  

Study on R&D Behavior and Pricing Strategy of Firms Based on Product Innovation

作　　者：李卫红[1,2] 陈圻[1] 王强[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京210016 [2]南京审计学院信息科学学院,南京210029

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2011年第2期67-75,共9页R&D Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901043)

摘　　要：当企业进行产品创新时,升级后的产品面临重新定价并带来市场竞争格局的改变.针对这一问题,将双寡头企业非对称R&D行为引入Hotelling模型,同时将传统Hotelling模型中外生的定价策略作为内生变量,研究技术溢出条件下的两阶段R&D/产品问题.研究发现,产品创新是提升企业竞争力的有效途径,歧视定价是企业获得超额利润的占优策略.在均衡定价策略下,创新企业表现出明显的研发"惰性,"R&D投入与技术溢出水平负相关.当政府对企业产品创新实施补贴时,创新企业则表现出研发过度的行为特征,R&D投入与技术溢出水平正相关,在均衡定价策略下,企业过度研发行为受到抑制,社会福利水平最高.When a firm conducts product innovation, the upgraded product will be re-priced, and market competitive manner will be changed. As for that, introducing the asymmetric R＆D behavior of duopoly into Hotelling model, and taking the product pricing strategy in traditional Hotelling model as an endogenous variable, it studies the two-stage R＆D/product model under the condition of technological spillovers. It concludes that product innovation is an effective way to enhance firm＇s competitiveness, and discriminatory pricing is the dominant strategy for each firm. Under the equilibrium pricing strategy, the innovative firm shows the feature of ＂R＆D inertia＂, and there is a negative relation between R＆D input and technological spillovers. When the government provides R＆D subsidies, the innovative firm shows the feature of ＂R＆D excess＂, and a positive relation exists between firm＇s R＆D input and technological spillovers. Under equilibrium pricing strategy, the finn＇s excessive R＆D behavior is restrained and the social welfare reaches the highest level.

关 键 词：产品创新 技术溢出 单一定价 歧视定价 博弈论 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学]