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出 处:《沈阳工业大学学报(社会科学版)》2011年第2期97-101,共5页Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)
基 金:国家社会科学基金资助项目(05BJY004);教育部社会科学基金资助项目(09YJA630101)
摘 要:控股股东代理行为会造成"利益侵占效应",探讨如何及时发现上市公司控股股东代理行为从而对其实施有力监管具有重要意义。以2005—2009年发生控股股东代理行为而被中国证监会公开谴责及处罚的公司为研究样本,采用理论分析和假设检验相结合的研究方法,发现对控股股东代理行为反应比较敏感的9个财务指标,并以它们为基础构建控股股东代理行为的财务指标监测体系,给出与之对应的经验监测值。监管层可以通过该财务指标监测体系及时发现某一上市公司是否存在控股股东代理行为,从而对其实施有效监管。The agent behavior of controlling shareholder will result in "benefit expropriation effect". It is of great significance to discuss how to find the agent behavior of controlling shareholder of listed companies as soon as possible so as to implement effective supervision on it. The companies which were denounced and punished by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission due to their occurrence of agent behaviors of controlling shareholders from 2005 to 2009 are selected as research samples. The research methods of theoratical analysis and hypothesis test are applied combinatively, by which nine more sensitive financial indicators reflecting agent behavior of controlling shareholders are found. A monitoring system of financial indicators of agent behavior of controlling shareholders is established based on them, and experiential monitoring values are calculated correspondingly. The supervision authorities can discover if there are any agent behaviors of controlling shareholders of listed companies timely by means of this monitoring system of financial indicators, in order to implement effective supervision on them.
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