农村饮水安全工程供给机制的博弈分析  

Analysis of Supply Mechanism of Safe Drinking Water Project in Rural Areas Based on the Game Theory

作　　者：李雪松[1] 李林鑫[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《生态经济》2011年第5期31-34,39,共5页Ecological Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(10BJY064);教育部人文社会科学规划项目(09YJA790159);武汉大学自主研究项目(人文社会科学);武汉大学"70后"学者学术发展计划"可持续发展战略下的环境法治"团队;"中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金"支持

摘　　要：农村饮水安全工程是农村公共基础设施和公共卫生体系的重要组成部分。文章主要从农村饮水安全工程的准公共产品属性出发,通过引入以政府与私人投资者为主体的博弈关系,分析博弈各方投资农村饮水安全工程的收益和在现实供需关系下的收益格局,特别是私人参与供给下的博弈均衡,对农村饮水安全工程供给机制进行研究。结合国内的经验借鉴进行实证分析,从而提出创新农村饮水安全工程供给机制的政策建议。The safe drinking water project in rural areas is an essential part of rural public infrastructure as well as of the public health system.This article proceeds from the quasi-public goods attribute of the project,to analyses the supply mechanism of safe drinking water project in rural areas.By introducing a game between the government and private investors for whether or not increasing investment,we can analyses the gains from the project and the gains structure on the ground of actual relation between supply and demand,especially the case of game equilibrium with the involvement of private investors.Furthermore,this article also includes empirical analysis of domestic experiences,with the purpose of putting forward policy proposals about innovation in supply mechanism of safe drinking water project in rural areas.

关 键 词：农村饮水安全 准公共产品 博弈 

分 类 号：S277.7[农业科学—农业水土工程] F224[农业科学—农业工程]