多任务环境下的创业投资家激励合约研究  

A Study on Incentive Contracts for Venture Capitalists in Multitask Environment

作　　者：熊维勤[1] 丁谦[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学长江上游经济研究中心产业经济研究院,重庆400067 [2]重庆商务职业学院,重庆400036

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第2期79-85,共7页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJC790279);国家社科基金重点项目(08AJY028)

摘　　要：在中国现行创业投资基金运作中,创业投资家通常同时进行着政府指定项目和自选项目的投资。文章在这一多任务环境下分析了三种不同组织模式下针对创业投资家的激励合约设计问题。主要结论包括:(1)若任务间的重要性存在差异,或不同任务产出的分布正相关,则不同任务间的激励强度并不必然互补,从而拓展了Holmstrom和Milgrom的经典结论;(2)若让不同的创业投资基金分别从事政府指定项目和自选项目的投资,则作为委托人的政府能获得更高的收益;若进一步引入相对业绩比较,则委托人获取的收益将更高。In Chinese venture capital funds,Venture capitalists usually invested in the government＇s designated projects and their own choosing items at the same time.Under this multi-tasking environment,the paper analyzes the incentive contract design problem for venture capitalists in three different organizational models.The main conclusions are： 1） If the importance among tasks is difference,or output distribution of different tasks is positive correlated,then the incentive intensity between different tasks does not necessarily complement each other,which extends Holmstrom and Milgrom＇s classic conclusion;2） If different venture capital fund engaged in government＇s designated projects and its own selecting items separately,then as the principal,the government could get higher net surplus in this specialization pattern;In particular,the principal would be benefited by introducing relative performance comparison in specialization pattern.

关 键 词：多任务激励 创业投资基金 互补性激励 对抗性激励 相对业绩比较 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]