风险导向审计:基于逆向选择的思考  

Risk-oriented Auditing: A Thought of Adverse Selection

作　　者：余艳[1] 孙永军[2] 

机构地区：[1]齐齐哈尔大学财务处,黑龙江齐齐哈尔161006 [2]齐齐哈尔大学经济与管理学院,黑龙江齐齐哈尔161006

出　　处：《商业经济》2011年第8期101-102,116,共3页Business & Economy

基　　金：黑龙江省教育厅人文社会科学项目:基于审计质量控制的审计行为规范与发展研究阶段性研究成果(11552319)

摘　　要：逆向选择不同程度地扩大了审计期望差异,反"逆向选择"的必然趋势使利益博弈最终体现在风险选择与责任的承担上。注册会计师与信息提供者之间因信息契约存在利益博弈过程,信息提供者因掌握有利信息而趋向逆向选择,审计市场以及资本市场的不健全,将增强这一趋势。风险导向审计能够针对高风险领域提高审计效率,但审计人员具备所需的独立性和胜任能力是前提假设。在我国审计市场和资本市场不健全以及信息提供者逆向选择机会较多的环境下,针对"职业怀疑"与"合理保证"问题,应增加一项特殊程序:人本环境测试与评价,以此来细化执业责任判断标准,且恰当地设定审计程序和界定风险领域。Adverse selection expand the auditing expectation gap to some extent,and the inevitable trend of reversed adverse selection holds interest game in risk selection and commitment to responsibility.There exists interest game between the certified public accountant and the information provider due to information contract,while the information provider prefers adverse selection for his or her favorable information,and the trend will be strong because of incomplete auditing market and capital market.Therefore,according to ＂professional suspicion＂ and ＂reasonable assurance＂,we should increase a special procedure-human environmental testing and evaluation-to refine criteria of professional responsibility and to design auditing procedures and define risk areas properly.

关 键 词：风险导向审计 逆向选择 审计期望差异 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]