地方官员参与区域经济合作意愿的理论研究——基于政治晋升竞争的视角  

Research on Local Officials' Willingness to Participating in Regional Economic Cooperation:A View Based on Political Promotion Competition

作　　者：王春雷[1] 黄素心[2] 

机构地区：[1]广西大学商学院,广西南宁530004 [2]广西民族大学商学院,广西南宁530006

出　　处：《石家庄经济学院学报》2011年第2期47-51,共5页Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目"区域经济均衡发展机制研究"(09CJL036);广西大学科研基金项目"政治晋升博弈下的区域市场整合研究"(x091028)

摘　　要：在一个政治晋升竞争框架下构建理论模型,对地方政府是否愿意参与区域经济合作的内在逻辑进行研究。相对于以往着重于分析改善地方官员考核机制的文献,更强调合作收益分配对地方政府选择的重要影响。结论表明,市场整合收益分配越合理,晋升竞争激烈程度越低,地方官员越有可能选择合作以促进市场整合。为促进区域经济合作,采取措施确保市场整合收益分配的合理性尤为重要。This paper constructs a more realistically theoretical model of political promotion competition to analyze the condition under which the local government chooses for cooperation. Comparing the literature emphasized on the analysis of political performance evaluation methods, we stress the effect of distribution about market integration re- turn on the choice of local governments. It is believed that the more fairness of the distribution about market inte- gration return, the less intensity of promotion competition, and the more likelihood local governments cooperate to facilitate the market integration. In order to promote the regional economic cooperation, it is very important to adopt some actions to advance the more fairness distribution of market integration return.

关 键 词：地方官员 晋升竞争 区域经济合作 

分 类 号：F019[经济管理—政治经济学]