国有商业银行股权激励作用的适用性——基于双重代理行为分析  

The Applicability of Equity Incentive in the State-owned Commercial Bank:Analysis on the Dual Agent

作　　者：孟昭民[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国联合网络通信有限公司莱芜市分公司,中国莱芜271100

出　　处：《上海商学院学报》2011年第2期89-93,共5页Business Economic Review

摘　　要：对我国的国有商业银行而言,银行经理人的社会关系网络决定了他的双重人格:作为银行的代理人,其行为服从银行所有者的利益,同时,其行为又要服从其社会关系网络或关联企业的利益。在这种情况下,国有商业银行的代理人就成了一个双重代理人。对该具有双重代理身份的经理人实施股权激励无疑是对国有商业银行所有权人利益的额外扣除。因此,对双重代理人的过度激励是不合理的,相反,应该在低度激励的情况下加强监督,完善监督机制。For the commercial banks in China,The manager＇s social network endows him with dual personality：as the agent of the bank,the manager＇s behaviour should submit to his principle＇s benefits,while the manager＇s behaviour will reflect the benefits embedded in the manager＇s social network.Under such situation,the manager of the commercial banks turns to a dual agent.Any equity incentive imposed on such a dual agent be doomed to a deduction from the benefits of the commercial banks.So the excess equity incentive on such a dual agent is irrational.On the contrary,a relatively low equity incentive on the dual agent is better while a supervision mechanism must be established.

关 键 词：国有商业银行 股权激励 双重代理 

分 类 号：F832.2[经济管理—金融学]